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Abstract. Recent years have witnessed increasing interest amongst international historians on the 
influence by experts on foreign policy decision-making.  Most work thus far has concentrated on 
American foreign policy since 1945, but this analysis broadens the focus to consider the impact of 
experts on British decision-makers through the use of informal networks below the level of Cabinet 
ministers whilst debating the future of the city of Danzig at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. It 
shows that despite a tendency by the protagonists to interpret their actions as subverting the official 
role and function of the Foreign Office, sufficient evidence can be found to suggest that through 
the use of back-channels to David Lloyd George, the prime minister, via Philip Kerr, his private 
secretary, some officials, such as James Headlam-Morley, within the Office managed to influence 
high-level decision-making at Paris.  Whilst experts must be seen as acting alongside professional 
diplomats, rather than marginalising them, a focus on the subject helps explain different 
approaches taken by participants at the Conference, and why senior figures such as Sir Eyre Crowe 
came to approve their intervention in the dispute over Danzig.  It also allows a new view to be 
taken of why the compromise decision was taken, despite the guiding principles laid down by the 
peacemakers in the year before the Conference opened.   
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Among all the territorial problems dealt with at Paris none was more difficult than that of Danzig 
. . . . This question was the cause of acute differences of opinion within the British delegation itself, 
and was debated with great persistency between the Allies during the four months which preceded 
the settlement.  The decision eventually arrived at was essentially a British one; it was suggested 
by members of the British delegation and carried through by the Prime Minister in the face of 
much opposition. 
Headlam-Morley, April 19252   
 
 
 
Writing in April 1915, Lewis Namier, recently demobbed from the 20th Royal Fusiliers owing to 
his poor eyesight, warned that “Pharisaic doctrine is almost as dangerous as the mongerer in 
‘political geography’”.3   His warning was apposite, as the Great War was in the process of 
destroying the established order of multi-national empires in Central and Eastern Europe.  The 
question that confronted statesmen was: what would replace them?  There was little agreement, 
save for the principle of national self-determination of peoples as a way to prevent a future war, 
when the present conflict was at least in part caused by the divisive force of frustrated nationalism.  
This concept, however, was far from a panacea to solve all of Europe’s problems.  In applying the 
principle of “political self-determination” in the disputed areas of the continent, Namier suggested, 
“perhaps we should be guided by instinct rather than strict logic”.  In these short lines, the future 
prominent historian of eighteenth century England outlined the key issue facing the peacemakers: 
the almost impossible task of matching a peace based on the goal of national self-determination 
onto the devastated patchwork territories of Central and Eastern Europe.  This was especially the 
case in the contested border regions, which had resulted in fluid national identities.4   
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The Paris Peace Conference was the first major international congress for which diplomacy 
was undertaken by statesmen and professional diplomats, but also by a large number of academics, 
serving in various capacities in their respective national delegations.5  Whilst Lord Castlereagh 
headed a British delegation to the 1815 Congress of Vienna numbering only 17, David Lloyd 
George, the prime minister, departed in January 1919 for Paris with almost ten-times that number, 
with 165 official advisors in the 500-strong British Empire Delegation – and more sent as problems 
multiplied.6  There were a number of reasons why academics had successfully entered the corridors 
of power during the Great War, although it should be noted that in general, this was only in an 
advisory capacity rather than playing an active role in policy-making.  This opportunity arrived 
for a number of reasons, first the call-up or volunteering of members of the Diplomatic Service for 
active service during the war and, then, the comparative paucity of available manpower to fill these 
roles.  The Foreign Office, in particular, found itself to be under public attack.  Shortly after the 
outbreak of war, the formation of the Union of Democratic Control shifted the focus to the conduct 
of foreign policy more generally.  It sought to remove the “aristocratic bias” and shatter the “small 
clique of professional advisors far removed from public control”.7  Opening up some sections of 
the Foreign Office to a select group of outside experts was one attempt to placate such calls for 
reform.8  In addition, with the outbreak of war, diplomatic intelligence ceased to flow from the 
states that found themselves at war with the other belligerents. And last, statesmen were confronted 
with deciding the future of large swathes of the globe, their knowledge of which was found to be 
lacking.  In France, Britain, and the United States, various military and political intelligence 
departments were formed or expanded to advise on conditions in enemy territory as well as liaise 
with propaganda departments.9  This was especially the case concerning Eastern Europe, which 
had emerged from the domination of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.  1919-1920 marked 
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the period of “peak intensity” for experts of the lands between the temporarily prostrate Germany 
and Russia.10  During the war, Woodrow Wilson, the American president, had already displayed 
his almost complete ignorance of both the history and geography of the region.11  Lloyd George 
was little better, admitting to the House of Commons in the midst of the negotiations in Paris that 
he had never heard of “that remote and miserable duchy” of Teschen.12  That the statesmen knew 
so little was not, however, due to a lack of material presented to them on almost every conceivable 
subject.  It was estimated that the American Commission to Negotiate Peace [ACNP] arrived in 
Paris with nearly 2,000 scholarly documents and 1,000 maps ready for use.13  The problem was 
the intersection between politician and academic, as well as between diplomat and academic.14  In 
Britain before 1914, there existed an uneasy relationship between the professional diplomat and 
amateur expert.  The Foreign Office firmly believed that policy “decisions could only be made by 
those trained in the complicated art of diplomacy”.15  The material written by academic experts 
was too voluminous for any interested party to digest, and the statesmen who gathered at Paris in 
the first weeks of 1919 were busy in the last months of 1918, for example, [delete Lloyd George] 
fighting the “coupon” election in Britain.  More important, the suspicion, common to most 
academics, was that the material was probably never going to be read in any case.16  Lloyd George, 
again, was a case in point.  One key part of his Philip Kerr’s job as his private secretary was to sift 
through, read the mass of material submitted to his master, and pass on what he considered the 
prime minister needed to know.17   
The role of experts has long been appreciated by students of the post-First World War 
Peace Conferences. 18  Traditional accounts, from John Maynard Keynes’s Economic 
Consequences of the Peace onwards, either ignored or downplayed the complicated and dynamic 
organisation of the Peace Conference to provide a more compelling narrative.19  Other participants, 
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like Harold Nicolson, a Foreign Office advisor, later recalled that he “never moved a yard” without 
consulting “experts of . . . authority”.20   Some of the legion of technical experts, historians, 
lawyers, and political geographers who attended the Conference did more than merely act as 
advisors to the plenipotentiaries who headed their delegations; they also often acted as negotiators 
in their own right.21  Many served on the various commissions and sub-commissions that were 
spawned as the business of the Peace Conference developed.  Some who served in this capacity 
were responsible for little more than making recommendations to the peacemakers and then 
drafting the provisions that were incorporated into the peace settlement. Others played a more 
prominent role, yet they could not be solely responsible for the formulation of policy, as they were 
not politically responsible; at Paris all matters were decided by the Council of Four, the heads of 
the British, French, American, and Italian governments.22  Nonetheless, in questions where there 
was a degree of ignorance on the part of the professional diplomats, there was an expectation that 
the “experts” would act on the basis of their expertise.  This principle was, however, rather uneven 
amongst the various Allied delegations.  The French and Italians tended to follow instructions from 
above.  Former members of the wartime United States “Inquiry” that looked at peace terms, for 
example, were chosen as members of the ACNP both for their knowledge and intellectual ability, 
but also for their connexions and political opinions.  In the British Empire Delegation, a small 
number of experts were included on the Foreign and War Office staffs, working as intelligence 
officers and “Advisors on Special Subjects”.  Unofficial networks amongst experts and advisors 
played an increasingly important role as the Conference at first meandered and then rushed towards 
the self-imposed deadline, 28 June 1919, when the peace with Germany was to be signed.   
The centralisation of British decision-making under Lloyd George’s “prime ministerial” 
leadership not only took policy-making away from the Foreign Office, but also limited its role in 
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even offering advice.23  In an attempt to reverse this trend, Lord Hardinge, the Foreign Office 
permanent under-secretary, formed the Political Intelligence Department [PID] in February-March 
1918, largely by poaching ten members of staff from the Intelligence Bureau in the Ministry of 
Information.24  It meant that within the Foreign Office, a group of “experts” were admitted who 
did not conform to the predominant pre-war social and professional background of the majority of 
Foreign Office officials, and this was to have important ramifications during the Peace Conference 
where the Political Section numbered a mere ten officials in addition to a further seven advisors.  
Of their number, one, James Headlam-Morley, a softly-spoken classicist who had temporarily 
transferred to various wartime propaganda departments from the Board of Education, was to play 
a significant role in the development of the Peace Conference, including finding a solution to the 
Danzig question.25  The proximity that Headlam-Morley was able to orbit around Lloyd George 
and Kerr allowed for the Foreign Office to have some degree of influence on the peace settlements, 
something subsequent scholars have not always fully appreciated.26  Appointed to Lloyd George’s 
“Garden Suburb” in February 1917 as a non-political amateur appointment, Kerr was responsible 
for advising the prime minister on Imperial and foreign affairs.27  Kerr was the only member of 
this group to survive into the Peace Conference, and his role expanded as he worked more closely 
with his political master, even serving as an unofficial diplomat himself.28  He shared some of the 
same suspicion that his chief felt towards professional diplomats and cultivated relationships with 
numerous experts, allowing him to provide detailed advice often in opposition to that coming from 
the other side of Downing Street.  Figures such as Sir Eyre Crowe, head of the Political Section of 
the British Empire Delegation, which effectively served with Arthur Balfour, the foreign secretary, 
as an advance party of the Foreign Office in Paris, was “almost in despair” as the prime minister 
had taken “everything out of the F.O.’s hands”.29  However, the preference that Lloyd George felt 
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for “private rather than official advice” did allow for some unconventional Foreign Office access 
to him outside of the usual channels.30   
These relationships developed during the last year and one-half of the war with the fusion 
of journalism and propaganda work.  Kerr, who had made a name for himself as the editor of the 
influential, but little read, journal, The Round Table, mixed in the same circles as R.W. Seton-
Watson’s New Europe group.  There was a remarkable confluence of contributors to these two 
periodicals and the staff of the PID.  Lewis Namier, the PID expert on Polish affairs, found himself 
excluded from the British Delegation in Paris, having fallen foul of Roman Dmowski’s exile Polish 
National Committee [KNP], yet, Headlam-Morley ensured him privileged access to Lloyd George.  
He wrote to Kerr shortly after the Conference opened:  
as you know, he [Namier] is not altogether persona grata, and it is I think increasingly 
difficult for him to get a hearing . . . I am sure that his knowledge and his point of view 
deserves attention.  I am, at his request, sending you privately and unofficially, some of the 
letters and papers which I have received from him.  I can feel little doubt from what I hear 
from other sources that in his main contention he is right.31   
As well as corresponding with Kerr, Namier continued an almost daily communication 
with Headlam-Morley, advising him on Polish and Ruthenian affairs.  His tone tended to be 
vehemently anti-Polish and these filtered, as Headlam-Morley did not uncritically accept his views 
on Poland, were also selectively passed on to Kerr and, through him, more selectively Lloyd 
George.32  It was through “individuals rather than institutions”, none more so than Headlam-
Morley, who worked in a rather uneasy relationship under Crowe on German problems at the Peace 
Conference, that the Foreign Office was able to provide a measure of influence over their chief, 
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including the compromise decision to create the Free City of Danzig.  Through his position at the 
Conference, Headlam-Morley acted “as a link between the old diplomacy and the new”.33   
A crucial problem for the experts was getting their advice under the noses of their political 
masters and then acted upon.  Opportunities for this largely depended on the roving interests of 
the Big Four – Wilson, Lloyd George, and the French and Italian premiers, Georges Clemenceau 
and Vittorio Orlando.  The knowledge, or otherwise, of the leading figures of the Conference on 
various questions could also enable privileged access to the inner workings of the Council of Four.  
One such issue that intersected both the attention and unfamiliarity of the leading statesmen was 
the future of Danzig, a German port city, but crucial for the future economic development of 
Poland, newly re-emerged as an independent state following 123 years of partition amongst the 
Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern empires.  The outbreak of war in 1939, ostensibly over 
Danzig, has ensured that the origins of the Free City have been examined extensively by 
historians.34  Such work has provided a comprehensive blow-by-blow account of the “politics of 
the great powers” in the midst of the negotiations over the Polish-German border.  The use of 
Poland as a pawn between the Allied and Associated Powers in 1919 is an aspect of the 
historiography that will only be touched on here.35  This study seeks to nuance their interpretations 
of both the decision to grant Danzig sovereignty through a free-city status, but also the debates 
amongst British officials on employing experts as opposed to professional diplomats through the 
use of private material either not available to or employed by other scholars.36  There is some 
disagreement about the basis of British policy towards Poland and its territorial boundaries.  Maria 
Nowak-Kiełbikowa was undoubtedly right that British policy was largely “indifferent” towards 
the frontiers of the Polish state, outside of the consideration that when Germany and Russia 
regained their status as Great Powers, they would be able to accept them and thus allow for stability 
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on the continent.37  In this context, the British were essentially “pragmatic” towards Poland’s 
territorial demands.  Lloyd George has been granted a prominent role from contemporary Polish 
participants and, subsequently, for following an anti-Polish policy that ensured that Poland’s 
territorial claims at the Peace Conference were not realised.38  For Dmowski, the sole Polish 
plenipotentiary until 6 April with the arrival of Ignacy Jan Paderewski in Paris, the “politics of an 
enemy was represented by a ruthless and cunning Welsh lawyer”.39  He continued, any “sensible, 
serious statesman” who did not work “wrongheadedly” would have seen a more favourable 
outcome for Poland’s territorial demands.  For Dmowski, the malign influence of Jews such as 
“that little Galician Jew”, Namier, who operated “behind the scenes”, was primarily responsible 
for Britain’s anti-Polish policy at the Conference.40  Whilst Namier communicated with Kerr 
extensively and with Headlam-Morley on an almost daily basis, his advice was treated with great 
scepticism due to his open anti-Polish bias.41  It is not possible to refute the hostility that Lloyd 
George periodically displayed towards Poles and their territorial claims, but decisions at the Peace 
Conference emerged largely as a result of following the principles laid down by the peacemakers 
in the year or so before the Conference formally opened on 28 January 1919.   
 What then were these principles, as applied to Danzig?  Headlam-Morley argued in 1923: 
In setting up the new Polish State, there were two principles which had to be followed: (1) 
There should be assigned to Poland all territories predominantly Polish; (2) Poland was to 
receive free and secure access to the sea.  It was under the second of these, and the second 
alone, that any Danzig question arose . . . all reference to historical facts and the former 
relationship of Danzig to Poland is completely irrelevant.42   
The principles by which the settlement in the West was decided were unworkable in the East: the 
strict application of national self-determination, which would have left Danzig under German 
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sovereignty, was rejected as it would not give Poland the necessary security, whilst a Polish 
enclave at the port of Neufahrwasser – a district of the city of Danzig – was rejected on the advice 
of the Admiralty on strategic grounds.  The third solution, to grant Poland full sovereignty over 
Danzig, was rejected on purely political grounds as it would have given Germany a ground for 
refusing to sign the peace.  The necessary result was that a “compromise was adopted” as no 
solution was acceptable to either Poland or Germany. 43  Strategically, Headlam-Morley 
acknowledged even before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, the arrangements for both Danzig, 
and West and East Prussia were “quite impossible”; but he saw it as “an advantage . . .  it seems 
to me the right thing frankly to build up a system which cannot be maintained” unless the League 
was sufficiently strong enough to impose “peace and disarmament”.44  This was no small matter, 
as “the treaty linked the viability of the Free City to the viability of the League of Nations” and, 
therefore, the entire international order.45   
 The shape of future peace settlement was considered from the early stages of the war, but 
planning towards the peace only really commenced in 1916.  Headlam-Morley became a central 
figure in this process, through his position as deputy director of the PID, under the leadership of 
the disinterested but occasionally brilliant Sir William Tyrrell, who saw his role as more defending 
the unconventional temporary political intelligence officers under his charge, rather than looking 
to use his position to try to shape policy.  Headlam-Morley, who had come to note as author of the 
most authoritative account of the immediate origins of the conflict, found himself the chief German 
expert in the PID, with his work taken seriously in the upper echelons of the Foreign Office.46  
This was unintentionally re-enforced by Lloyd George’s attempt to circumvent the Foreign Office 
by assigning the task of preparing the formal British peace brief to his advisor, the South African 
General Jan Smuts. The overworked Smuts was forced to rely on the large body of PID memoranda 
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sent up to him.47  The task ultimately proved too much for him, and instead of a single document 
of the type the American Inquiry produced, the British Delegation relied on the PID’s “P” series 
of memoranda, which constituted the “Foreign Office case”, augmented by material from other 
departments.48  Headlam-Morley was assigned the task of producing a short brief for the settlement 
in Europe as well as Germany.   
 Both memoranda outlined the view that the territorial problems facing Western Europe had 
already been “brought to a satisfactory conclusion”. 49  Whilst broad areas of policy had 
transformed well from statements of war aims in the West, this was not the case in the East where 
the unresolved problem of revolutionary Russia loomed over the Peace Conference.50  The main 
question relating to Germany’s western borders was Alsace-Lorraine, the return of which was a 
long-standing and firmly established war aim of all of the Allied Powers.  The Foreign Office 
argued it was not desirable that “His Majesty’s Government should take any initiative or interfere 
with regard to it”.51 In contrast, the disputed borderlands between Germany and the new Polish 
and Czechoslovak states were repeatedly raised in the discussion of Allied war aims, but no 
consensus had been reached since the discussion began in earnest after the opening of the Russo-
German Brest Litovsk peace talks in December 1917.52  The Allied Governments, at a meeting of 
the Supreme War Council on 3 June 1918, formally pledged themselves to the Versailles 
Declaration that sought “the creation of a united and independent Polish State, with free access to 
the sea”.53   To fulfil this declaration, the Foreign Office initially hoped that a “commission 
consisting of representatives of Germany and Poland” should be appointed to determine the new 
frontier, which would “leave a clear strip of territory in German hands, connecting East Prussia 
and Pomerania, Danzig being left to Germany” under the provision that the German government 
would grant Poland “full and free communication with the open sea, and will either establish the 
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town of Danzig as a free port, or will permit, as an alternative, a free port to be established on 
German territory under Polish sovereignty”.54  Such a solution proved hopelessly naïve, and even 
without the inclusion of German and Polish representatives on the Commission on Polish Affairs, 
it proved to be one of the most divisive issues confronted by the Peace Conference.   
 The Foreign Office memorandum on the “Settlement with Germany” was emblematic of 
the problems facing the British Delegation in Paris.  As Crowe, newly returned to political work 
after serving in the Ministry of Blockade, minuted, “in the plan of work and distribution of duties 
in connection with the Conference, no specific place” had been “given to ‘Germany’ as a whole”.55  
As usual, Crowe volunteered to “superintend” any such work, to which Hardinge agreed.  The 
ever-cautious Crowe then urged a pragmatic approach: “I would strongly advise our not pulling 
the chestnuts out of the fire for the Poles or Lithuanians.  Let them worry the other Powers first, 
and let us reserve our opinions when we see how the situation develops”.56   
Simultaneous with Headlam-Morley’s memorandum on Germany, other parts of Whitehall 
were attempting to grapple with the same issues.  The War Office, seeking to advise the Cabinet 
from a strategic perspective, acknowledged that neither a narrow strip of German territory linking 
East and West Prussia or a “narrow tongue” of Polish territory “projecting from Poland proper to 
the sea” would be militarily defensible.57  Esme Howard, until October 1918 the British minister 
at Stockholm, recalled to the Foreign Office with responsibility for the settlement in Northern and 
Eastern Europe, suggested that rather than a Polish Corridor, the Germans should be allowed such 
a corridor through Polish-inhabited territory, following the line of the main railway from West to 
East Prussia “in which should be included the district and town of Danzig”.58  Howard made his 
proposals on the basis of self-determination, but noted that compensation could be given to 
Germany, “set off through the reparation due by Germany” to Poland to allow it to buy out private 
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interests in mines in Silesia as well as the port of Neufahrwasser.  This proposal fell in line with 
the recommendation of Professor Charles Oman, the expert commissioned to advise the Foreign 
Office on a possible solution to the German-Polish border.  Oman argued that Danzig, on the 
principle of “racial determination”, should remain German, but that the port of Neufahrwasser 
should go to Poland.  Whilst, he suggested, this “may appear highly unnatural” – he equated it as 
drawing an international frontier between Glasgow and Greenock – it was the only way that he 
could see to reconcile the contradictory aims.59  Howard, often accused in the subsequent literature 
of pronounced pro-Polish views on account of his Catholic faith, argued for a pragmatic solution 
with a “strong and compact Poland” including all indisputably Polish territory, but excluding 
“large alien minorities” that would run the risk of “recreating the conditions which in the 18th 
century led to the partitions of Poland”.60  The formal Foreign Office submission on Poland, under 
Howard’s signature, but heavily influenced by Namier, re-enforced this by arguing that Danzig 
was the “most difficult” of all the problems connected with Poland, and acceding to Polish claims 
would merely “create an unstable position which would probably render the Polish position 
untenable if, and when, Germany recovers”.61   
 The British were, of course, not working in a vacuum. The French and Americans as well 
as the Poles all submitted long cases for the future eastern frontier of Germany.  Almost all sought 
to assign Danzig to Poland, fulfilling Woodrow Wilson’s war aims – the thirteenth of his “Fourteen 
Points” – rather than on the basis of national self-determination.62  For S.J. Zwierchowski, who 
worked in the Polish Division of the Inquiry under the name Zowski, the “principle of nationality” 
should be cast aside, arguing that it “must not be blindly and mechanically” applied to the case of 
Danzig, where history had “furnished unmistakable proofs of a small foreign colony being 
perfectly happy of and grateful for its allegiance to a greater nation”.63  Statistical evidence was 
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also deliberately ignored, but on the basis of the moral case for the uncompromising policy of 
Germanisation that had been pursued in the Prussian partition of Poland by the Wilhelmine regime.  
For the territory either ceded to Poland directly, according to the “falsified” 1910 German census, 
out of a total population of 2,931,000, some 1,844,000 were Polish: 62.91 percent.64  In the 
plebiscite areas, the proportion was 58.89 percent – 1,540,000 Poles from a total population of 
2,615,000.  Even taking into account the manipulated statistics, the Regierungsbezirk of Danzig 
was an overwhelmingly German town well before the question arose in the last years of the Great 
War, with Poles only constituting 16,000 out of the total pre-war population of 324,000, some 4.94 
percent.65  It was clear that either a question of principle or longer-term questions of stability were 
going to have to be compromised at the Peace Conference. 
 The chaotic working methods of the early weeks of the Peace Conference actually 
facilitated a close working relationship between experts in the British and American delegations.  
Before the structure of territorial sub-committees was set up in February, the necessity was to push 
the mass of work forward.  Clive Day, the American expert on the Balkans, wrote in his diary on 
8 January 1919, “if we are going to accomplish anything here, I feel confident that we shall do it 
by working with the English, who are far less selfish and particularist in their aims than any of the 
other powers except ourselves”.66  Howard and Robert H. Lord, the American expert on Poland, 
met to find a joint position on the German-Polish borderlands.67  The resulting Howard-Lord 
Agreement of 5-6 February generally sought to grant the most favourable border as possible to 
Poland, following “the linguistic frontier as closely as topography and some peculiarities of the 
railway system will allow”.68  This was a reversal of Howard’s position on Danzig before the Peace 
Conference opened.69  The same day as Howard submitted his draft agreement, Headlam-Morley 
read the text and immediately submitted a memorandum to Hardinge on the question of the Polish-
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German border as it “raise[d] serious problems of policy” on account of the fact that Howard had 
completely reversed his position on the Polish Corridor.70  Headlam-Morley “ventured to urge, 
therefore, that this decision be seriously reviewed and considered, not only in connection with the 
Polish question, but with the general question of the German treaty”, a matter for which he – and 
Crowe – was responsible rather than Howard.  Crowe agreed with Hardinge’s assessment that the 
Howard-Lord agreement was “unfortunate from an ethnographical, self-determinant and common 
sense point of view”.71  Senior Foreign Office officials and their political masters who saw the 
Howard-Lord agreement were almost unanimously against it, seeing perhaps the wider issues that 
it would throw up.  Dr. George Prothero, soon to resign as head of the Foreign Office Historical 
Section, noted that if the agreement were followed, “Germany would never forget her loss”.72   
Howard, perhaps too open in his opposition to Lloyd George’s proposal to invite all shades 
of Russian political opinion to meet on the island of Prinkipo, was despatched to the entirely 
peripheral fact-finding Inter-Allied Commission to Poland.73  Tyrrell, his replacement as nominal 
British expert on Polish affairs at Paris, was little interested in them.  On 21 February, the 
Commission on Polish Affairs met in the absence of both Howard and Lord, the latter sent to 
Poland for the more justifiable reason that the Americans assumed that it was sensible to send 
someone knowledgeable to assess the situation.  As such, it was left to others to draft the 
recommendations to the Supreme Council in Paris.  In their task, they were largely left to “work 
out . . . problems as it thought just and right, always bearing in mind the general principles adopted 
by the Peace Conference”.74  The American representative on the Commission, Isaiah Bowman, 
tried to interpret the few signs coming from Wilson, and Tyrrell left much of the detailed 
negotiation to H.J. Paton the Polish expert in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, who had 
been called to Paris to replace Howard, and Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Kisch, who served in 
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the Military Intelligence Division. 75   It was only on 1 March, at the third meeting of the 
Commission, that the Polish-German border was discussed.  Tyrrell announced that the British had 
“already completed a study as regards the western frontier of Poland”.76  He immediately handed 
over to Kisch, who explained that it was  
based mainly on ethnographical distribution, [with] due account being paid to economic 
considerations, particularly those affecting means of communication [a reference to the 
port of Danzig].  Wherever possible, existing administrative frontiers had been adhered to 
so as to simplify the process of delimitation and to give rise to the minimum of disturbance 
in the normal life of the inhabitants.77   
The memorandum referred to by Tyrrell was in fact written by F.B. Bourdillon, also of the Naval 
Intelligence Department – not Paton as usually ascribed – and described “some suggested 
modifications of the ethnographic frontier” that would provide Poland with access to the sea but 
the possession of no “usable port and of means of communication with it”.78   
 Bowman casually mentioned that the Americans had “prepared a study of this frontier on 
the same principles” and, “except a few minor deviations”, the line proposed was the same as the 
British.  The British and Americans effectively confirmed the exclusion of the other Allied 
delegations, as it was based on the Howard-Lord Agreement of 3 February,79 rather than the 
conclusions of a second meeting of Anglo-American specialists on 21 February. 80   Whilst 
Bowman led the Americans, only Paton of the British members of the Commission on Polish 
Affairs was present at the meeting, which accepted the Howard-Lord recommendations regarding 
the southern boundary of East Prussia.  According to Paton’s later recollection, “the French 
showed a little restiveness . . . but the French produced no materials or maps of any kind”.81  The 
responsibility for drafting the border was thus left to a Sub-Committee consisting of General Henri 
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Le Rond, Bowman, and Kisch, who deliberately looked to draw the frontier from the south to give 
themselves more time to get some instructions on the thorniest issue: the fate of Danzig.82   
 Almost no instructions were forthcoming, however, with the result that the First Report of 
the Commission on Polish Affairs recommended “the question of the town and port of Danzig has 
been the subject of the very careful consideration by the Commission, who are unanimously of the 
opinion that . . . [it] should be given to Poland in unrestricted ownership”.83  Crowe, a member of 
the Central Territorial Committee, had an opportunity to comment on a near final draft of the 
Report on 12 March. Other than some reservations about the extent to which plebiscites should be 
used, he recommended, along with the American delegate, Sidney Mezes, the adoption of the 
Report, “having had time to examine the line of the frontiers”.84  Indeed, when the Committee next 
met two days later, led by Kisch, “no one proposed to modify the line recommended for the western 
frontiers of the Polish state”.85 Namier, in London, was not surprised by the recommendation to 
award Danzig to Poland, but he warned Headlam-Morley that if the same arguments were “applied 
to Ulster [it] wd. drive it all into the sea, or would deliver it to Sinn Fein”.86   
 The First Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs was discussed in the inter-Allied 
Council of Ten on 19 March.  Bowman later recalled that on reading the recommendation to grant 
Danzig to Poland, “suddenly Lloyd George changed from a state of bored indifference to one of 
aggressive participation.  From that moment forward Lloyd George never relaxed his interest or 
his control”. 87  The prime minister voiced strong objections, but the members of the Polish 
Commission refused to alter their recommendations, despite further discussion in the Council of 
Ten on the morning of 22 March.88  Not for the first time, Lloyd George was leaked against, with 
reports of his objections appearing in the French press.89  Concerns over Danzig were not the 
primary reason for him to spirit away with a small group of his trusted advisors – not including 
18 
 
 
any member of the Foreign Office – to the Hotel de France and D’Angleterre in Fontainebleau 
over the weekend of 22-23 March.  The top of Kerr’s list, with news arriving of the establishment 
of a Hungarian Soviet Republic the day before, was a German “Peace which can accept 
Bolshevism”.90  Compared to the situation in Germany, stability in Poland was of secondary 
importance. 91   The first draft of the Fontainebleau Memorandum, dictated by Lloyd George 
“giving a general trend of his thoughts” only mentioned briefly placing Germans under Polish 
rule.92  The final draft, revised and expanded after further discussion with Kerr, Sir Maurice 
Hankey, the British Delegation secretary, and General Sir Henry Wilson, the chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, warned that if Germany felt “unjustly treated”, it would “find means of exacting 
retribution from her conquerors”.93  In an oft-quoted passage, Lloyd George unleashed what would 
become a public broadside.  Using much of the same language he employed in the Council of Four, 
the proposal of the Polish Commission that we should place 2,100,000 Germans . . . under 
the control of a people . . . which has shown a proverbial incapacity for self-government 
throughout its whole history must in my judgment lead sooner or later to a new war in the 
East of Europe.   
To avoid this course, “as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated 
to their homelands”, with this “fundamental criterion” needed to “override considerations of 
strategy or economics or communication”.  To reverse the recommendations of the Commission, 
he chose the Foreign Office as his tool.94  Kerr passed a draft of the Fontainebleau Memorandum 
to Tyrrell, the only Foreign Office member to see it before its completion, asking for comment.  
Danzig, he remarked, was a “great difficulty”, and the “only solution” he could suggest was that 
it should be made a “free port under an international commissioner”, resurrecting a plan from the 
Quai d’Orsay – as well as Balfour – for the first time since the Peace Conference had opened.95  
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Crowe was then despatched, nominally as a member of the Central Committee on Territorial 
Questions, but at the “special request” of the French, to arbitrate.  In all likelihood acting under 
instruction from Lloyd George, Crowe rebuked the Commission, reminding them that “the 
question is whether, as we have already here made recommendations about the frontier, whereas 
this Commission is rather charged with making a recommendation”;96 the stenographic record 
added that he reminded the Commission, “we don’t fix these frontiers – we merely submit 
recommendations”.97  Despite Kisch’s opposition, “it was settled that . . . the principles laid down 
by the British Delegation [i.e. ethnographic principles, and not moderated by economic or 
historical considerations] might thus serve as the basis for the work of the commission”, and that 
“the territories whose ethnical character was debatable or uncertain, should not at present be 
assigned to Poland”.98  These principles were also used to sway Woodrow Wilson, who then used 
them to ensure that Fiume should not go to Italy.99  These terms were then presented by Lloyd 
George to the Council of Four on 27 March both as the only viable basis of peace between both 
Germany and Poland and also for Europe in the long-term.100   
 The following day, over dinner with Lloyd George, Henry Wilson, and Hankey, Crowe 
was given an “unpleasant and thankless task” of proposing an “alternative scheme of frontiers 
which will lock off Poland from the sea”.101  Crowe met Lloyd George again on 1 April, but still 
no detailed instructions were forthcoming.  Not unreasonably, Crowe complained to his wife that 
the Lloyd George did “not know from one day to another what he wants.  He has now given to 
someone else entirely contradictory instructions, on lines altogether different from what he told 
me”.102  The other official was Headlam-Morley, who received his instruction directly from Lloyd 
George, on Kerr’s recommendation, three days previously, on 29 March. He was granted “official 
authority” to deal with this question – along with Homer Haskins of the American Delegation – 
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by the prime minister’s request on 2 April, the day after Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George had 
decided the fate of Danzig in the Council of Four.103  It is clear that Crowe thought that he was to 
be given the authority to deal with the entire Polish question, with Headlam-Morley reporting to 
him, but Headlam-Morley, in effect, worked directly for Lloyd George through Kerr.104  In this 
capacity, he provided Lloyd George with reasoned objections to the decision to allocate Danzig to 
Poland.105  The prime minister had given him a “sort of roving commission . . . to deal with German 
matters”, including reversing the recommendations of the unanimous Commission on Polish 
Affairs.106  On 7 April, the decision reached by Lloyd George was announced at the meeting of 
Allied prime ministers. The main point of difference with the Commission remained Danzig, now 
to be a Free City.107  It was, however, on the Lloyd George’s orders that Poland would not be given 
sovereignty over Danzig.  The Commission on Polish Affairs had been brought to heel, Crowe 
replaced the ill Tyrrell, who returned to London suffering from conjunctivitis on 17 April; and, 
with Headlam-Morley, Kisch, most outspoken in defending the First Report, co-signed the revised 
memorandum, “Relative to the Settlement of the Danzig Question and the Polish Frontiers of East 
and West Prussia”. It was submitted on 20 April to the prime minister and amounted to a victory 
for Lloyd George over the Commission on Polish Affairs.108  A precedent had clearly been set by 
Lloyd George’s objection to the First Report of the Commission on Polish Affairs.  Woodrow 
Wilson proposed to ask that “all our territorial commissions” should “review their reports and to 
change them if need be along the lines indicated by our fundamental principles”.109   
 As was not untypical, however; when Lloyd George’s eye moved onto other matters, the 
direct line of contact was broken.110  He also thought it “rather unfortunate” that the French had 
been “entirely left out” over Danzig.  Headlam-Morley later reflected in 1925, 
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there is no record as to the reasons why this abnormal system was adopted; the only 
conjecture I can make is that the French objected so strongly to any revision of the decisions 
arrived at by the commission that they refused to have anything to do with it, and left the 
responsibility entirely with the British and the Americans . . . . in the drafting of this part 
of the treaty they had no share, and no responsibility . . . except that which arises from the 
fact that after the draft had been completed they accepted it.111 
The peacemakers at Paris were essentially given a choice between drafting a treaty that the 
Germans might not sign and, in the words of Paton, the “real danger of Poland’s collapsing 
immediately with the result that anarchy would sweep over Europe and a genuine peace possibly 
postponed for years”.112  Faced with this choice, the “Big Three”, led by Lloyd George, readily 
accepted by Wilson and reluctantly by Clemenceau, chose to disregard the Polish case over Danzig 
in what they saw as an effort to provide a lasting peace.113  Disagreements over the Polish-German 
borderland were not so much debates between the Poles and the Allied statesmen and officials, but 
more within the delegations themselves, and more significantly between the delegations and their 
political masters.  The direct result of the manoeuvrings over Danzig was to sow the seeds of 
mistrust amongst the wartime Allies over the motives of the British that dogged international 
relations throughout the 1920s.114   
 What then were the implications of the negotiations over Danzig for the working of the 
Foreign Office in the immediate post-war period?  Other officials in the Office sought to get a 
hearing with Lloyd George through Kerr, although with less success.  Howard attempted to reverse 
the Council of Four’s decision on Danzig by sending memoranda from two temporary clerks in 
the Admiralty, acknowledging perhaps that it was unlikely that his professional advice would be 
heeded, or even seen, by the prime minister.115  For Crowe and Headlam-Morley, an exchange of 
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private letters at the beginning of June 1919 is instructive.  Whilst Crowe was relieved not to have 
to deal with Danzig, he was angered by the further use of Headlam-Morley by the Council of Four 
to draft the Polish minority protection treaty.116  He saw “a slight on the Foreign Office”.117  
Headlam-Morley’s position as an outsider was keenly felt, and he was forced to justify himself to 
Crowe, arguing 
I have always considered myself merely as the representative of the Foreign Office . . . .  
Since I came to the Foreign Office a year ago, my one effort has been to do everything in 
my power to help the work of the Office as an Office.118  
Crowe responded warmly, reassuring Headlam-Morley that “there is noone here who more 
than I appreciate the work which you have contributed to the peace settlement”.119  Frustration at 
the way in which key questions were being “dealt with and settled over the heads of Hardinge and 
myself, and I hear even of Mr. Balfour” led to the not uncharacteristic outburst.  In a number of 
tense meetings with Hardinge, Headlam-Morley was made to feel quite how annoyed his superior 
was for undertaking work at the “initiative of the Prime Minister” and then working independently 
of the Foreign Office.120  Headlam-Morley defended himself, arguing that he had “never had any 
kind of instructions” from his superiors in the Foreign Office.   
 The accusation that the use of experts had undermined the Foreign Office, however, 
seemed to stick, but was not part of the decision to close the PID, which occurred against 
Hardinge’s wishes through post-war budget cuts.121  Most of the PID staff, including Namier, had 
already left government service before the Department was closed.  Others, including Headlam-
Morley, in the newly-created position of Historical Advisor, remained in the Foreign Office.  The 
back-channel to Downing Street was effectively closed well before Kerr’s resignation in March 
1921.  The “system . . . of autocratic government” developed during the War, which both enabled 
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and necessitated the early experiment in informal networks between policy advisors and experts, 
effectively came to a halt in 1922 with the fall of Lloyd George.122  For him, the system was more 
pragmatic, as he sought out experts who would undertake the detailed labour, following-through 
on his impulses.123  It is likely that the temporary clerks who served as experts at Paris saw their 
fate: that their time influencing policy-making directly was coming to an end.  A group of British 
and American experts and politicians, excluding their French colleagues, held a meeting, convened 
by one temporary clerk, Lionel Curtis, on 30 May 1919 to propose an “institute for international 
affairs” that would facilitate continued access to, and discussion with, diplomats and statesmen.124   
 Kerr’s informal network was central to the debate over the application of the problematic 
concept of national self-determination in the eastern half of the continent, yet there were strict 
limits to its influence. Writing to her brother-in-law, Arthur Cayley Headlam, bishop of 
Gloucester, in August 1919, Headlam-Morley’s wife, Else, noted of her husband’s role in Paris 
that “unfortunately it lies not in his power to change the Peace Treaty into a decent thing; he can 
only make insignificant improvements; yet this is better than nothing”.125  The fate of Danzig was 
decided on wider geo-political interests as they arose, rather than any reference to national self-
determination, or a determined plan to deprive Poland of Danzig.  It did not figure in Lloyd 
George’s mind before it lodged there for a short time in March-April 1919.  It is hard to disagree 
with Headlam-Morley’s observation that “the people at the top had no really clear conception of 
what they wanted: as always they are being driven by events and do not foresee them”.126  Concern 
about a return of German power, and with it the prospect of reactionary pact between Soviet Russia 
and Germany, preoccupied Lloyd George, and it swayed his Council of Four colleagues.  Thus, 
the security concerns of the wider European settlement trumped the idealism of many of the 
delegates at Paris, both experts and permanent officials.  For Poland, this meant that after 1919 
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Britain clearly saw her obligations towards Danzig and the German-Polish frontier as being “only 
those of one member of the League of Nations to another”.127   
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